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Fetishizing the will in juvenile 
justice, policy, and practice
Alexandra Cox
Our preoccupation with young people’s capacities to successfully develop, grow up, and to 
change is age-old. When a young person is accused of a crime, those concerns become more 
acute and the questions more perplexing: Do young people grow out of crime? Do they need 
assistance in doing so? If so, what form should that assistance take? We know more clearly than 
ever before that the vast majority of young people age out of crime, even those charged with 
serious offenses (Mulvey 2011; Mulvey et al. 2004). Thus, do interventions matter? If so, how 
do they matter with respect to a young person’s role as a citizen-in-waiting? Juvenile justice 
programs demand that young people work on their capacities to be compliant with the law and 
thus exercise self-control and control over their will. Juvenile justice interventions raise critical 
ethical questions because they are aimed at shaping young people’s roles as compliant citizens 
in the liberal state.
It is arguable that these questions about the relationships among paternalism, justice, and lib-
erty are particularly salient in the study of juvenile justice systems in the United States today. 
Since the country’s first juvenile courts were founded at the turn of the twentieth century, they 
have sought to distinguish their role—ostensibly one aimed at “rehabilitation”—from that of the 
adult justice system—“punishment” (Tanenhaus 2002; Schlossman 1977). Today, many states are 
shifting toward what they describe as a more “rehabilitative” approach to juvenile punishment in 
response to what has been presented by advocates for reforming the system as the overreaching, 
punitive, and zero tolerance mentality of the 1990s-era forms of punishment aimed at teenagers. 
The rhetoric of reformers quite consistently focuses on the need for softer, more caring forms 
of “treatment” over ostensibly harsher forms of “punishment.” This rhetorical strategy is not a 
new one: there have been a number of previous eras of reform in which advocates have sought 
to distinguish an older, more punitive system against the newer, more rehabilitative system they 
seek to build (Bernard & Kurlychek 2010). The approaches endorsed by system reformers today 
have included the expansion of treatment programming within facilities, particularly cognitive 
behavioral therapies and so-called “trauma-based” modalities (Council 2012; National Juvenile 
Justice Network, 2012). The new approaches are distinct in that they rely heavily on the idea that 
the practices are evidence-based, rational responses to previous regimes that have failed children. 
The positive outcomes found in these so-called “evidence-based practices” are those which result 
in lower recidivism rates than comparable programs. As so-called “evidence-based” treatment 
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programming has expanded in these juvenile facilities, it has arguably become more critical to 
assess the ethics of these programs, particularly in the ways that they impact on young people’s 
abilities to participate as social agents and citizens in a liberal democratic order. The reason these 
ethical questions are particularly relevant is that the state’s reliance on and appeal to “evidence” 
sometimes prevents scrutiny of the underlying motivations and morality of such practices. The 
focus on the singular outcome of a reduction in recidivism (often over a short period of time) also 
obscures the significance of softer dimensions of “success” in individuals’ lives, such as their  ability 
to build a “good life” where avoidance of arrest and prosecution is not central to their existence 
and instead they are full participants in the social world, engaged in pro-social relationships, 
housed, and productive in their labor (Ward & Brown 2004). In practice, policy-makers’ invoca-
tion of the term “evidence-based” builds the legitimacy of their choices to employ rehabilitative 
practices that are immune from the critiques of those who might deem them “soft” on crime.
As scholars have long suggested, juvenile justice interventions have long been understood to 
be repressive—particularly in their effectiveness of maintaining class positions and hierarchies—
rather than liberating (Platt 1969/1977; Schlossman 1977). Thus, as we see a new form of reform 
more focused on treatment and less focused on harsh discipline, do these newer programs do a 
better job at facilitating young people’s future role as social agents and citizens?
As social agents, individuals require adequate conditions under which they can develop, 
grow, and act in the world in a way that is functional for their well-being and that of those they 
are connected to (see also Farrall, Bottoms, & Shapland 2010). The conditions under which 
they can arguably develop and grow into their potential as social agents are those that nourish 
the dimensions of human agency most related to the “capacity for autonomous social action” 
( Calhoun 2002): the habits and routines—or dispositions—that undergird the human’s position 
in a social world (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and the space for reactive, unconscious desires 
to be understood and developed in relationship to one’s understanding of choice and action 
(Elliott 2002; Hitlin & Elder 2007).
This research
These questions about paternalism and governance in the juvenile justice system were explored 
through two qualitative research studies inside New York’s juvenile justice system, conducted 
over a period of three years, from 2008 until 2011. The first study explored young people’s 
capacities to exercise agency and ultimately to get out and stay out of the juvenile justice system 
in the context of rehabilitative programming that was explicitly aimed at facilitating “change” 
in them (see, e.g., Cox 2011). Staff members within these institutions are trained to implement 
programs that seek to stimulate young people’s acceptance of responsibility for their actions, 
their acceptance of the rules of the institution, and by extension, a form of self-regulation. The 
second study examined staff members themselves, analyzing some of the ways that they engaged 
with and resisted these tools aimed at young people’s self-change (Cox 2013).
The programs in New York’s juvenile facilities are putatively aimed at stimulating young 
people’s capacities to lead lives that are compliant with the law upon their departure from the 
facility. The facilities employ a medley of programming that focuses on stimulating individual 
change; they range from cognitive behavioral approaches to those with crudely behaviorist 
orientations.
This chapter explores the ways that these programs uphold a notion of the will—and in 
fact fetishize that idea of the will—in ways that damage and can destroy young people’s agential 
capacities. I use the term “fetishize” here to suggest that the idea of the will that is possessed by 
program administrators in juvenile facilities is in fact one that is both impossible and irrational 
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for young people to control. I also argue that power over the will is fetishized by program 
administrators as the source of change in young people who have committed wrongdoing, 
when in fact this is a false or misleading site of preoccupation.
Many contemporary policy-makers and advocates focus on the damages of juvenile incarcer-
ation on young people’s bodily integrity—the harms of physical and sexual abuse, for example, 
or the dangers of regimes focused entirely on punishment and deprivation (Bernstein 2014). 
While it is important not to disregard these critiques, it may be useful to explore some of the 
“persuasive” forms of discipline (Schlossman 1977) aimed at facilitating change in young peo-
ple’s capacities for self-control, rather than the more explicitly and overtly physical forms of 
punishment.
Many contemporary programs in juvenile facilities seek to change the individual through 
a combination of incentives and earned privileges. In his recent study of the role of behavio-
ral change regimes in men’s prisons in England, Ben Crewe (2009) has found that behavioral 
change programs in prisons exhibit a form of what he calls “neopaternalism,” in which people in 
prison are induced to improve themselves in ways that are “soft” in their influence, as opposed to 
the “hard” and authoritarian prison regimes of the past, where the forms of control were overt 
in their physical demands on inmates, their unilateral forms of power and control, and their clear 
and rigid forms of spatial separation and control. This form of “soft” power also arguably exists 
in contemporary juvenile facility life, but in a more embedded form: The behavioral change 
expectations are woven into the fabric of daily life of the facilities and affect young people from 
morning until night. From the making of their beds to the way they hold their bodies, they 
are monitored and assessed by staff members who use those assessments to determine a young 
person’s progress in a way that is described in facility life as “the program.”
The program of change
In juvenile facilities across the United States, programming is structured around a model of 
behavioral advancement; young people progress through “stages” of change that map onto ideas 
about the stages of moral development that were proposed by developmental psychologists 
 (Piaget 1955; Kohlberg 1976).1 Many facilities employ a token economy to try to incentivize 
such advancement; in New York State, young people receive privileges associated with their pro-
gress through the behavioral stage system. Their place in that system is symbolized by the color 
of their shoelaces, with white being the lowest stage and green the highest.
The ideal typical resident in New York’s juvenile facilities is constructed through the pro-
gram design and literature as an individual with a fully pliable and programmable will. The 
young person’s exercise of will is arguably the primary aim of the behavioral intervention. 
A model resident—and one who obtains the privileges and advantages associated with such 
a status, including an opportunity for early release—is one who can successfully demonstrate 
control over his or her will.
There are four core ways in juvenile facilities in which young people can demonstrate this 
ability to control their will: through their bodies, through their embrace of a philosophy of self-
change and self-help, through deference to staff rules, and through the acceptance of respon-
sibility for both the actions that led them to the facility and the responsibility of maintaining 
order—both physical and social—within the institution.
Ironically, although those in charge of the institutions described the institutions as 
treatment-oriented, little in the way of treatment was observed within the institutions on a 
daily basis. It is theorized that this in part occurred as a result of the extensive reforms aimed at 
introducing new treatment modalities. Facing confusion about what treatment and behavioral 
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change modalities they were expected to use and which ones they were expected to abandon, 
and noting that many of the new tools resembled older ones, a number of staff members simply 
gave up on employing treatment strategies, and instead relied upon the enforcement of rules and 
the expectation that they might facilitate change. Staff would occasionally engage in group treat-
ment with young people and employ cognitive behavioral change curricula, but they more fully 
relied upon behavioral expectations rather than interventions to guide change within young 
people. In this sense, then, it is arguable that staff in the institutions was not in fact concerned 
with change as much as focused on institutional order and management. It is also arguable that 
juvenile justice systems have long been concerned with the idea that young people’s engagement 
in juvenile delinquency represents a failure of personal control (Reiss 1951). One of the most 
direct avenues to a form of control that staff members found they could exercise over young 
people was through the route of rules and regulations, as opposed to treatment for change.
Bodily change
Throughout institutional life, young people’s bodily functions, habits, and expressions were 
monitored and policed by staff in ways that were connected to the regulation of the will. 
Self-control over one’s physical actions thus came to be equated with personal control. Policing 
of the body was almost exclusively focused on directing young people to regularly keep them-
selves clean and, at least outwardly, self-possessed. Staff often focused on what was described as 
“hygiene,” directing young people to shower, braid their hair, and keep themselves regularly 
clean, often in infantilizing ways for the overwhelmingly late adolescent population who was 
ostensibly capable of self-grooming and dressing. The staff often demanded that young people’s 
uniforms be tucked in and that their pants be pulled up. In classrooms, they made young peo-
ple sit up straight in their chairs or walk straight in lines as they moved throughout the facility. 
Although there were no facility rules that enumerated these forms of bodily control, they were 
the unwritten priorities of staff within the facility. In over four years of observational research, 
I noted many instances of staff members urging young people to demonstrate that they were in 
control of their bodily functions and their bodies in ways consistent with and demonstrable of an 
expression of willful self-control.
You come here alone, you leave here alone
The expression “you come here alone, you leave here alone” was used by a number of staff 
members in institutions, often in an effort to discourage young people from engaging in conflict 
or from seeking the approval of their peers. The expression reflected staff members’ attempts to 
engender notions of “personal responsibility” among the young people.2 It grows out of the 
personal responsibility discourses that these young people came of age in—many of them were 
born in the early 1990s, and their parents were forced to participate in onerous welfare to work 
programs as a result of Clinton-era welfare reform programs, enacted in 1996, that explicitly 
relied upon discourses of personal responsibility (c.f., Fraser 1993). The welfare reforms of the 
1990s increased the number of sanctions that individuals faced if they failed to meet the require-
ments imposed by state welfare administrations that mandated individual movement toward jobs 
and education, sometimes at the cost of the lives of children and families. Some states chose to 
impose a federal law that required that those with felony drug convictions would lose access to 
food stamps; other states imposed a federal rule banning access to public housing for those with 
a drug conviction. The welfare rolls decreased sharply after welfare reform, but not necessarily 
to the advantage of poor people (Soss, Fording, & Schram 2011).
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The program of behavioral change in the facilities was often explicitly linked to ideas of per-
sonal responsibility by staff members. For some staff members, the notion of personal responsi-
bility was seen as perhaps the most integral part of the change process. One staff member refused 
to accept my offer to donate the book Race, Crime and the Law, by Randall Kennedy, because 
he said that the title of this book might convey to them that they could blame racism instead of 
taking personal responsibility for their actions (he had never read the book). While speaking to a 
group of young men at a juvenile facility, a judge echoed this sentiment when he said “you have 
the keys to your jail cell in your control.”3 Staff would routinely implore young people to avoid 
engaging systemic or structural critiques of the juvenile justice system and their routes into it.
These notions that “getting out” of treatment are connected to an individual’s focus entirely 
on themselves is one that also has increasing purchase in contemporary prisons, which have 
highly individualized forms of punishment and treatment (Crewe 2009). They have unique pur-
chase in American prisons, where staff members engaged in the practice of what has been called 
“color-blindness”—or their choice to suppress young people’s assertions of racial identity and 
racism in favor of what they said was a more liberal minded assertion of “color-blindness” and 
individualism (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Fused with their critique of youth claims of structural disad-
vantage, the focus on the individual melded well with staff members’ promotion of the notion 
of hard work on oneself as a “way out” of the juvenile justice system and thus their endorsement 
of the “American Dream.” In many senses the staff members were themselves living what they 
felt that “Dream” was—they possessed a secure, unionized, and well-paid state job, and many of 
them had made it out of the impoverished urban core into a secure rural, middle-class exist-
ence.4 Thus, there is a sense in which they were projecting their own notions of success onto 
the young people under their care.
The notion of “freedom coming from within” can be found in some prisoner narratives and 
literatures (see, e.g., McCall 1994) and is one that is arguably a source of ontological security—
or a sense of continuity and order in the events of one’s life (Giddens 1991)—and grounding 
for some people who are incarcerated and a source of relief from some of the feelings of loss 
of control that imprisonment causes. A number of the young people felt that time in custody 
was their sole responsibility and that it was entirely “on them” to do that time. However, their 
expressions of doing their time on their own may be distinct from this notion of freedom from 
within in that it was actually about managing and surviving the behavioral change program 
they were expected to complete. A number of young people spoke about the notion of change 
coming from within while simultaneously acknowledging their struggles with managing the 
behavioral change program and their fears about surviving beyond it.
Young people would reflect these notions of individualized progress in their descriptions of 
their experiences in the facilities. One young woman spoke about how each young resident’s 
program was her “responsibility” and that this could only be accomplished successfully alone. 
A young man said that while he was in the residential facility “I’ve been in control 100 per cent 
of the time,” and that “every decision I made was on my own.” Another young man similarly 
spoke about his realization that the only way he could do his time in residential custody was to 
“do me,” and that it was best to ignore other people in that process:
… all you gotta do is ignore. If you can ignore somebody, if you can ignore negativity, you 
will be the best person that you can ever be. You can be the best.
Many staff members encouraged young people to do their time “alone”—through contem-
plation, introspection, and self-control—rather than with the assistance of others. Staff relied 
upon familiar narratives of self-reliance and willful self-change that some have argued are a 
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key component of our contemporary mood economy (Silva 2013). Yet it seemed that the staff 
members’ inducements to the young people to “do me” often seemed more like attempts to get 
those young people to avoid conflict with others in the period of their incarceration, and thus 
seemed to serve staff interests and institutional prerogatives rather than the developmental needs 
of young people. In fact, “doing me” might actually work against a young person’s interest in 
the sense that they were asked to be introspective and independent in a context where interde-
pendency and relationships might better serve their broader needs in growing, developing, and 
building character.
These narratives of responsibility were supported by the philosophy of the cognitive behavio-
ral change treatment programs that were in use in the juvenile facilities. These “evidence-based” 
programs are undergirded by a philosophy of personal responsibility and control; in their deep 
focus on the psychological nature of self-control, and deliberate shift away from socio-structural 
explanations for offending, these programs work to support an emphasis on the responsible self. 
In some program curricula, for example, a young person’s decision to speak about their previous 
experience with abuse or violence may be an indicator of their inability to take full responsi-
bility for their actions.
Other scholars examining the lives of young working class people in the context of con-
temporary life have identified the ways that young people embrace a self-change narrative in 
the face of structural disadvantage and social insecurity (Silva 2013; Furlong and Cartmel 2007). 
Structural changes in recent years have severely limited opportunities in the labor market for 
young adults (Rampell 2009; Sum et al. 2008). We live in a changing social order, where tran-
sitions to adulthood have become less fixed, lengthening young people’s periods of depend-
ency upon their parents and guardians and slowing their transition to full citizenship (Furlong 
and Cartmel 2007). In the face of this insecurity and uncertainty, young people—especially 
working class and poor young people—have increasingly embraced self-help and self-change 
narratives (Silva 2013). The narratives are, in a sense, a means of exerting control over a future 
that seems increasingly out of their control. These experiences of economic uncertainty were 
arguably magnified by the stigma of the criminal conviction and the collateral consequences of 
incarceration, perhaps leading to many young residents ironically embracing the idea that their 
happiness and well-being lay in their own hands and that their change process belonged to 
themselves. The staff in the facilities actively rewarded young people for embracing these ideas 
about selfhood and often discouraged them from relying upon their peers and others for support 
in such change.
Peer contagion and relational ethics
Consistent with the notion that “peer contagion” was the cause of delinquency, staff often 
appealed to the idea that young people’s engagement with their peers was dangerous and 
toxic—that peers are only sources of tension or conflict, or temptation, not of progress. These 
ideas are as old as the inception of America’s juvenile justice system (Schlossman 1977). Young 
people were not allowed to speak to each other at meals and during movements throughout the 
facility, and they were discouraged from talking to each other during their down time in their 
rooms. They were not allowed to remain in contact with each other or staff members once they 
left the facilities. While there has been a great deal of research literature devoted to the negative 
effects of peer relationships on adolescents’ capacities to offend, the knowledge about which is in 
part leveraged by institutional authorities to discourage peer interaction, we increasingly know 
and understand that adolescent friendships can be an important facilitator of healthy develop-
ment and wellbeing (Way 2011).
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This opens up a puzzle: Can juvenile justice interventions recognize the role of healthy rela-
tionships in the development of character? Juvenile justice institutions typically conceptualize 
adequate behavioral change on the part of young people through their emphasis on young 
people’s individual self-change; this is rooted in the notion that individual change facilitates a 
change in character. Yet, what we are increasingly learning in the literature on adolescent devel-
opment and also in that about desistance from offending is that stopping offending happens 
with others—in fact, one’s relationship to others is critical to an individual’s ability to change 
(Weaver 2012; McNeill 2009). It is arguable that the staff members’ focus on young people’s 
individual-level change, barring them from peer interaction, fails to appreciate the importance 
of an approach to treating young people that is concerned with and engaged with the poten-
tial of relationships to develop and sustain an individuals’ ethical engagement in the world; this 
has been termed care ethics by some. Care ethics seek to “structur[e] relationships in ways that 
enhance mutuality and well-being” (Lawson 2007: 3). They acknowledge the critical impor-
tance and existence of interdependency in a world that increasingly imagines the liberal subject as 
an autonomous, willful individual (Lawson 2007: 3). Care ethicists argue that interdependence, 
mutuality, and care are actually critical to the establishment of a political economy rooted in 
justice, dignity, fairness, and trust (Lawson 2007: 3).
It was arguable that the juvenile facilities and their staff had a paradoxical relationship to 
such “care.” Juvenile justice institutions often distinguish themselves from adult institutions in 
their differential focus on treatment and “care.” Yet, as many scholars have argued, care and 
control are often two sides of the same coin (Sharland 2006; Phoenix 2009). The ban on 
relationship-building among teenagers in the facilities—ostensibly articulated as a form of “care” 
or treatment—served facility management purposes as opposed to preventing peer contagion. 
The notion of peer contagion finds its roots in long-standing sociological ideas that young peo-
ple tend to commit crime in groups and that they learn crime in interaction with others; the 
idea is that if delinquent peers are grouped together in institutions like juvenile facilities, they 
may develop and learn antisocial behavior from each other. Researchers have found compelling 
evidence that peer group interventions, including those in juvenile facilities, aimed at reducing 
delinquent behavior actually amplify that behavior (Bayer, Hjalmarsson, & Pozen 2009; Dishion, 
McCord, & Poulin 1999; Dishion & Tipsord 2011; Mennis & Harris 2011). However, some 
researchers have found that young people can also exert positive, protective peer influences on 
each other and that not all interactions are negative ones (Lee & Thompson 2009).
This culture of individualism gave rise to some considerable ironies. The staff themselves 
knew that they were not only far outnumbered by youth residents in the facility, but that if they 
never allowed these young people down time on the unit to play cards, watch television, and talk 
to each other—to build relationships—that they would not be able to effectively run the facility. 
The staff members did not allow young people to engage in this kind of down time for purely 
instrumental reasons; this was in part a tacit recognition of young people’s need for an “escape” 
from the indignities of facility life, including behavioral change programming. They found this 
“escape” through care and concern for each other. The staff members’ decision to allow these 
relationships to proceed was arguably an acceptance of the dignity of the residents amidst facility 
rules and demands for order. The staff could also enjoy their own down time in these moments; 
I often observed them reading books, snacking, catching up on paperwork, playing cards with 
the young people, and even sleeping.5 While discussions about “structure” and “control” were 
very much part of the public transcript in the institutions, it was these moments of unstructured 
down time that arguably enabled the young people and staff to thrive.
The moments in which staff members prevented young people from speaking to each 
other—during movements, meals, and classes—were those times when they were perhaps able 
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to exert the least amount of control over the young people. These were delicate, tightrope-like 
moments—those in which the young people were expected to obediently follow the directives 
of staff about movement and bodily control, but also ones in which they were most interested 
in resisting the terms of their domination because the prohibition on speaking seemed most 
illogical to them. These moments were also an effort to get young people to express willful 
control over their engagement with others at times that were beneficial to the institutional staff, 
not necessarily to the young people themselves. In other words, the irony of willful self-change 
narratives in juvenile facilities was that they supported and sustained facility order as opposed to 
actually facilitating change. It is the moments in which willful self-change was not encouraged 
that its fictional underpinnings were revealed. The units were quiet, calm, and free of violence 
when young people and staff were able to rest and be introspective and be engaged and rela-
tional and involved in voluntary, self-motivated interactions but not be bored. While the experi-
ence of boredom is typical for many teenagers, it could be quite dangerous in the facilities: it led 
to higher rates of violence and the greater use of physical restraints by staff against young people.
Deference
Upon entering a facility, residents were given a manual in which they learned about the behav-
ioral stage expectations and rules they needed to follow. The basic rules required deference to 
staff authority, compliance with rules and procedures, “work[ing] out problems” through treat-
ment programs, exercising “self-respect” and respect for others, honesty, cleanliness, and being 
quiet (New York State Office of Children and Family Services 2008). The facility staff convened 
“treatment team” meetings, at which a young person’s progress in treatment would be moni-
tored. At each treatment team meeting, staff filled out forms that identified the extent to which 
each resident was making progress in meeting his or her behavioral goals and expectations. 
Deference to staff members formed a core part of the expectations outlined in the forms. These 
included items demanding that young people follow the rules of the facility and exhibit respect 
toward staff. If a young person successfully exhibited such deference, he or she was rewarded 
within the treatment team process.
A resident’s compliance with treatment in juvenile facilities is considered analogous to the 
normative processes of development and maturation, in which one moves from dependence 
on others to independence. The principles behind this behavioral change model stem from the 
idea that, through these treatment interventions, young people will be prepared to make more 
rational choices—they will be more willful in their actions. The young person’s evolution toward 
these choices is expected to closely follow models of moral development developed by the psy-
chologist Jean Piaget (Morash 1981). This process is considerably more bounded than the paral-
lel experience of maturation in a non-coercive context. The first stage (Orientation, described as 
a “Reluctant Learner” stage in a staff training manual) teaches residents that they “will be watched 
very closely by staff,” who will tell them what to do, and that if they stay on track, “it will also 
improve the way you control yourself.” In the next stage (Adjustment, described as an “Enthu-
siastic Learner”), a resident is expected to work without direction, demonstrate improvements 
in programs, and to show “other evidence that you are accepting your placement and under-
stand why you have been placed here.” In the third stage (Transition, a “Cautious Performer”), 
residents are expected to take more initiative in their deference to the rules of the program, 
using the “skills” that they have obtained in the facility (such as “anger control” and “prob-
lem solving”) and show that “you are able to say that you feel sorry for your crimes and take 
responsibility for your negative behaviors, without blaming others.” In the highest-level stage 
(Honors, a  “Competent and Committed Performer”), residents should be encouraging their peers 
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to “be positive and to make good choices” by showing “improved self-esteem by cooperating 
with staff and program expectations.” Residents are given what is called a “Resident Behavior 
Assessment” at their treatment team meeting, on which their stage progression is based. They are 
also sometimes given “Behavior Improvement Plans.”6
These forms of assessment comprise what Banks (2008) describes as “scripted” notions of 
change. The programs are largely aimed at encouraging residents to follow the rules. According 
to one “Resident Progress Report” issued to him, a young resident named David engaged in 
multiple incidents and rule violations, which are the markers of resistance to change in the insti-
tutional setting, at least in terms of his ability to be released and to receive a higher-level stage. 
Yet, he complied with or exceeded all of the expectations listed in the report, except for the 
expectation to “describe acceptable methods for controlling impulsive behavior and use them 
with staff direction.” His initial delinquency offense, like that of many others, is less important 
in this context than his continuing misbehaviors, which play a role in defining his identity as 
someone who needs to learn the significance of compliance with norms (Banks 2008).
David arrived at the residential center after a long period of time in the “community,” doing 
an alternative-to-incarceration program. He lived with foster parents, who had adopted him 
after his mother abandoned him as a child, choosing to maintain her drug addiction. While he 
was in residential care, David started receiving letters from his incarcerated father for the first 
time in his life, learning that his father was going to be released within months and wanted to 
see him. During my visit with David at the residential facility, he showed me the letters he had 
received from his father, which were posted up on the wall of his room. David’s abilities to make 
choices and solve problems, however, were not evaluated with his family history and circum-
stances in mind, even though they may have played a role in shaping his behavior in the facility 
and arguably in his demonstration of self-control and personal control.
Was the behavioral stage model actually a treatment tool, or was it in fact a tool for social 
control within the institutions? In other words, did the stage process and the rule-making that 
accompanied it, actually facilitate behavioral change? There was little evidence to suggest it did. 
Instead, I observed that the expectation that young people exhibit deference to staff members 
more often than not discouraged or inhibited reflection on, and expression of, their personal 
histories and emotions in ways arguably detrimental to their character development.
Jacob’s story7
Like a number of other young residents around him, Jacob was able to articulate his investment 
in the process of “willful self-change.”8 He worked hard in the facility on what he felt was his 
self-improvement: He got a coveted job in the facility’s kitchen; he earned his way into a college 
course; and he was on the highest behavioral change level. He spoke about how he wanted to 
become a police officer after he left the facility. On the day he left the facility, he felt his life had 
been transformed as a result of his own hard work in the facility; he was ready to be successful 
because he had changed while he was inside. Yet, when he arrived at home, he had to confront 
his structural disadvantage and the collateral consequences of his incarceration. He faced serious 
difficulties in re-enrolling in school, finding a secure and sustaining job, navigating the foster 
care system in which he remained, and building pro-social relationships and emotional stability 
after receiving no support or interventions while he was inside that would equip him with the 
skills to do so.
Jacob, an ideal and successful juvenile facility citizen, found himself struggling after his release. 
The programming and interventions in the juvenile facilities weren’t concerned with Jacob’s 
past; in fact, as a number of criminologists have sought to argue, psychotherapeutic programs 
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based in insight development are seen as too costly and ineffective to implement and have 
been abandoned in favor of Moral Reconation Therapy, Aggression Replacement Training, and 
Thinking Errors curricula, all of which were in place at Hooper. As far as the system was 
concerned, Jacob’s ability to develop the impulse control skills necessary to prevent him from 
exploding in anger in his low-wage job that he got after he left the facility was one of many 
similar aims—these programs conceive of desistance in a rather static way, as the ultimate state of 
self-control. Jacob, like other young people in the facility, was discouraged from forming bonds 
with his peers and prohibited from staying in touch with the facility staff he had connected to 
and anyone else who might be connected to the facility while he was on parole. So, his “success” 
in the facility—his ability to follow the rules—was intended to signal his ability to stay crime 
free on the outside.
Throughout his young life, Jacob was abandoned by his biological parents and by the systems 
and safety nets (including the child welfare and mental health systems) that were intended to 
protect him against such abandonment. And he suffered: Shortly before he was incarcerated for 
his case, his mental health had deteriorated, and he was in a crisis. Yet, as many putatively compe-
tent and intelligent young people do, he was able to mask this crisis in the context of a criminal 
case that necessitated self-protective behavior, both at the jail where he was initially sent and 
then at the boys’ facility, Hooper, where he was sentenced. His mental health and child welfare 
records didn’t follow him to Hooper and when offered medication, he refused; this would have 
meant he appeared weak to his fellow residents. He found “the program” of behavioral change 
at Hooper relatively easy to manage because he was a fairly compliant young man; he had to 
be, as someone who had grown up with few attachments to his biological parents, he aimed to 
please whatever adult figures with whom he could form even a minimal bond.
But when a crisis struck, Jacob’s past quickly haunted his present. He had no friends beyond 
those who were selling guns and drugs; he was manic and paranoid and had received no con-
sistent mental health care in confinement, and he had no understanding about how to leverage 
resources in the community on his own behalf after he lost his foster parent very suddenly. 
His life spiraled out of control, and he is now incarcerated with only a handful of people who 
remain in contact with him. Jacob had developed limited abilities to engage in what has been 
termed as “ethical self-correction” ( Jacobs 2014). After his foster parent died, Jacob was robbed. 
Despairing and panicking, Jacob felt that the only possible solution to this perceived injury was 
to injure someone else.
In part, these actions emerge quite logically from an institution that fetishized willful self-
change. From the ages of 14 to 17, Jacob was in an institution that taught young people that 
the only power to change was under their own control. If they engaged in conflict with others, 
the philosophy of the institution was that they should be separated until they “cooled off ,” as 
opposed to learning how to mediate conflict through ethical engagement with one another. 
They were taught that they should follow the rules of all adults but not learn how to set rules 
themselves or cultivate an understanding about moral engagement with others; that they should 
change their behavior but not their values. In other words, they were taught to simply perform 
their responsibility for their actions as opposed to developing insight into why they engaged in 
those actions. There weren’t any facility-based curricula or interventions aimed at facilitating 
young people’s understandings of difficulty and disappointment and how those difficulties and 
disappointments were not only inevitable, but might also lead them to gain greater insights into 
the antecedents of their harmful actions (Craib 1994). They were only taught the very individ-
ualized form of “anger management,” as opposed to empathy, care, and concern.
Jacob’s story illustrates some key questions about agency and the will. Interventions in the 
juvenile court context have, even as they take on different shapes and forms over the history of 
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this country’s juvenile justice system, specifically been centered around the idea that young peo-
ple are citizens-in-waiting. They are unformed, underdeveloped, and so on, and it is in part the 
role of the intervention to help to shape that character (c.f. also Kennelly 2011). Young people 
who offend are in a sense bearing a multiple burden through the intervention. Not only are they 
being “corrected” for their criminal behaviors, but they are also expected to learn adult-imposed 
“responsibilities,” which, it is assumed, will help them to grow up and learn how to abide by the 
rules—and moral standards—of the adult world. As Jacqueline Kennelly puts it, they “must be 
carefully guided toward suitable degrees of self-regulation” (2011).
The interventions in the juvenile justice context are arguably ones which are really deeply 
concerned with character development. Yet, they operate with a paradoxical construction of 
young people—malleable, yet also, ultimately, capable of a great deal of resistance to being 
shaped and governed. Thus, the solution used by juvenile justice administrators is to create 
programs of change that are highly simplistic in their vision of what constitutes “agency.” In 
the latest iteration of the juvenile justice system, the interventions are deeply informed moral 
development theories, which inform the behavioral “stage” system used in the facilities I stud-
ied, yet in a crude and often coarse way. What I observed was that their translation was one that 
ultimately resulted less in moral “development” than in a kind of adaptive conformity. Without 
the ability to develop one’s moral responsibilities in a context that provided thicker opportuni-
ties for questioning, relational insight building, and so on, the facilities simply enforced passive 
compliance with rules, rather than active engagement with them.
Many of the young people in the juvenile facility are in a sense deeply alienated from their 
sense of agency, despite the fetishizing of the will that occurs in the facilities. This alienation, 
I think, is actually enhanced by three discrete processes: the literal alienation and isolation that 
comes along with incapacitation; the existentially demanding and potentially troubling form of 
alienation that occurs when one must devote his or her entire time in confinement to com-
pliance with “the program”; and the deep forms of despair and isolation that accompany the 
copious amounts of “down time” and thus boredom they experience—which explains why the 
average amount of sleep the young people get each day sometimes exceeds 12 hours.
Juvenile facility practices raise key questions about the governability and regulation of young 
people accused of crimes. Within the context of the juvenile prison, those young people who 
are rewarded the most are seen to be those who are the most “governable.” Yet what appears to 
be wrong here are the terms by which governability is set. I argue that the forms of regulation 
themselves have a very crude vision for what constitutes the redeemable subject of reform; this 
is ultimately a young person who is, in a sense, a “bad” citizen—one who is passive, deferential, 
lethargic, apathetic, and under-informed. Those who are seen to be ungovernable find them-
selves in the adult criminal justice system.
Conclusion
The juvenile facility programs fetishize the expression of the will in order to regulate and con-
trol young people as opposed to facilitating their development and the development of their 
character. I found in my research that the programs actually acted to inhibit young people’s 
capacities to make decisions for themselves both within the facility and beyond it. If performed 
perfectly, program participation served program ends rather than benefiting the young people; 
the form of agency that they were taught to exercise sometimes facilitated order within the 
prison and young people’s short-term adherence to the law (at least for a few months after they 
left the facility), but the young people rarely accrued any real benefits in the form of agency 
they were taught to enact. In this sense, it was not “agency” per se, it was a form of enforced 
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self-regulation. The facilities’ programs squelched young people’s development as relational, 
insight-driven beings, capable of coping with despair and difficulty as well as the legitimate bar-
riers they faced as individuals with the stigma of a criminal record or experience in a juvenile 
prison, as well as their near-constant exposure to criminalization via stop and frisk and other 
policing tactics. This has serious consequences for the development of character and the capacity 
to care for others.
Notes 
 1 See Abrams and Anderson (2013), Inderbitzen (2007), Fader (2013), Nurse (2010), and Reich (2010) 
for contemporary accounts of residential juvenile facilities in states around the country.
 2 The notion of “personal responsibility” is said to be consistent with the “ethos of individual autonomy” 
associated with philosophies of advanced liberalism, and it relates to inducements to self-government 
(Rose 2000: 329).
 3 This judge would often speak of his own story as an individual raised in a working class community in 
New York City and making it out to the middle class through hard worth and thrift.
 4 See Watkins-Hayes (2009) for her analysis of bootstrapping language employed by Black and Latino 
welfare bureaucrats.
 5 These activities by staff may not have been allowed, but they often became a way of coping with time, 
particularly when staff were given mandated overtime shifts, which required them to work for 16 hours 
straight.
 6 Those residents who have been designated as sex offenders must admit responsibility for their actions 
as a prerequisite for release from the Sex Offender Treatment Program.
 7 Some identifying details about Jacob’s relationships and this incident have been changed in order to 
protect his confidentiality.
 8 I use pseudonyms throughout this chapter for the names of young people and the facilities they were in.
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